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Subjectivity as 
Self-Acquaintance 
Abstract: Subjectivity is that feature of consciousness whereby there is 
something it is like for a subject to undergo an experience. One per-
sistent challenge in the study of consciousness is to explain how sub-
jectivity relates to, or arises from, purely physical brain processes. 
But, in order to address this challenge, it seems we must have a clear 
explanation of what subjectivity is in the first place. This has proven 
challenging in its own right. For the nature of subjectivity itself seems 
to resist straightforward characterization. In this paper, I won’t 
address how subjectivity relates to the physical. Instead, I’ll address 
subjectivity itself. I’ll do this by introducing and defending a model of 
subjectivity based on self-acquaintance. My model does not purport to 
reduce, eliminate, or naturalize subjectivity, but it does make sub-
jectivity more tractable, less paradoxical, and perhaps less dubious to 
those averse to obscurity. 
1. Introduction 
One feature of consciousness that many find mystifying is subjectivity 
— that feature whereby there is something it is like for a subject to 
undergo a conscious experience. A lot of philosophers say that sub-
jectivity is mystifying because of its relation to the physical — 
because it’s hard to see how it could arise from the physical goings on 
in the brain.1 But subjectivity itself can also be mystifying. For it’s not 
clear how to understand the nature of subjectivity or its place in the 
                                                          
1  See, for example, Levine (2001), Chalmers (1996), Nagel (1974), and McGinn (1983). 
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overall structure of consciousness. These two points are distinct, but 
connected. For in order to address the question of how subjectivity 
relates to the physical, we must first have a clear sense of what sub-
jectivity is. 
I won’t address how subjectivity relates to the physical in this paper. 
Instead I will address subjectivity itself. I will do this by introducing 
and defending a new model of subjectivity based on self-acquaint-
ance. No such model currently exists. But some philosophers have 
nibbled at the idea. William James, for example, says: 
[The self of all the other selves] is felt… It is at any rate no mere ens 
rationis, cognized only in an intellectual way… It is something with 
which we also have direct sensible acquaintance, and which is as fully 
present at any moment of consciousness in which it is present, as in a 
whole lifetime of such moments. (James 1890/1983, p. 286) 
In a similar spirit, Bertrand Russell somewhat cautiously says, ‘It is 
probable, though not certain, that we have acquaintance with the Self’ 
(1912, p. 80). Gottlob Frege also flirts with self-acquaintance, saying, 
‘Everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in 
which he is presented to no one else’ (1918/1977, p. 333). And, more 
recently, Saul Kripke endorses and defends Frege’s claim, saying: 
Each of us does have a special acquaintanceship with himself or herself, 
as philosophers from Descartes to Frege have held. This self-
acquaintance is more fundamental than anything purely linguistic, and 
is the basis of our use of first person locutions. (Kripke, 2011, p. 319) 
So the idea that we are self-acquainted does have some historical 
pedigree. But it has not yet been developed in any detail. And, as 
impressive as its history is, it has an equally impressive, and even 
more voluminous, history of being mentioned and then quickly 
rejected. One way or another, self-acquaintance has not yet received 
the attention it deserves. So my goal is to take what James, Russell, 
Frege, and Kripke find compelling and develop it into a self-
acquaintance model of subjectivity. My model does not purport to 
reduce or naturalize subjectivity,2 but it does make subjectivity more 
tractable, less paradoxical, and perhaps less dubious to those averse to 
obscurity. So even if some reject the particulars of my model (as is 
                                                          
2  Indeed, for the purposes of this paper, I will remain neutral on the truth of naturalism, 
reductionism, and also physicalism about consciousness (and thus subjectivity). My 
model of subjectivity neither presupposes nor entails a position on these issues. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 90 M.  DUNCAN 
inevitable), I aim to at least exemplify and promote a way of talking 
about subjectivity that is free from obscurity. 
As with any project of this type, the proof of the pudding will be in 
the eating. That is, the ultimate reason to adopt my model will derive 
from its faithfulness to the manifest nature of subjectivity, its fruitful-
ness in helping us to better understand what subjectivity is, and its 
effectiveness as a theory about a very real, very important, and yet 
very difficult to grasp phenomenon. These are the standards upon 
which my case will rest. 
2. Subjects and Subjectivity 
As I said, subjectivity is that feature of consciousness whereby there is 
something it is like for a subject to undergo an experience (cf. Nagel, 
1974). This is a feature of our consciousness. We are the subjects in 
question. That’s why subjectivity is often called ‘mineness’ or ‘for-
me-ness’. Thus, I take the fact that our experiences have subjectivity 
to imply that we are the subjects of our experiences. So I take it to 
imply that we are subjects. 
What is a subject? Already we are in disputed territory. But in order 
to understand what subjectivity is, we must understand what a subject 
is. So this will be my starting point. Following a broadly Aristotelian 
tradition, I take a subject to be a bearer of properties. It is a thing with 
attributes. Here I am relying on a distinction between things (or 
substances or objects) and their properties. Rocks, cars, mountains, 
cats, trees, and people are things. The ways these things are constitute 
their properties. Rocks are hard, mountains are tall, people are 
rational, etc. So, most generally and fundamentally, I take subjects to 
be things that bear properties — i.e. things that are certain ways. 
Our focus here is on subjects of experience. So to say that I am the 
subject of an experience implies that I bear a certain kind of property 
— namely, an experiential or phenomenal property. If I am in pain 
right now, I am the bearer of a pain property — painfulness is 
instantiated in me. To say that I am a subject of experience in general 
— rather than a subject of a particular experience at a particular time 
— is to say that I am the kind of thing that can, and at least sometimes 
does, undergo conscious experiences. Thus, I am a subject of 
experience. 
But I am a subject of other properties, too. I am human; I am a 
certain height; I am sitting, typing, and so on. Thus, being an experi-
encer is just one of the many ways that I am. And to be a subject is not 
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necessarily to be an experiencer. A red ball, for instance, is a subject 
of redness and roundness, but it doesn’t experience anything. Thus, 
the first step toward demystifying subjectivity is to understand that to 
be a subject is just to be a member of a very general, very basic ontol-
ogical category that includes many other things besides experiencers. 
All of this may seem obvious. But many philosophers working on 
subjectivity eschew the account of subjects that I’ve just described. 
And I believe that this is one major source of confusion in the litera-
ture on subjectivity. It has led some philosophers working on sub-
jectivity to say a subject is, for example, experiences or an aspect of 
experiences (Husserl, 1984, p. 362; Williford, 2006, p. 121), or a 
dimension of experience (Zahavi, 2005, chapter 5), or the way in 
which experiences are given (Henry, 1973; see also Zahavi, 2005, pp. 
105–6). And neglect of what an ontological subject is and isn’t has led 
some philosophers to deny that we are subjects because they think this 
would imply that we are Cartesian egos, ‘ego poles’, or some other 
unlikely sort of thing (Natorp, 1912, pp. 102–3; Zahavi, 2005, p. 
126).3 Subjecthood in my sense needn’t lead us down any of these 
dark alleys. In my view, to say that we are properties (or events) is a 
category mistake. We are things — things that bear properties. But 
this doesn’t imply that we are Cartesian souls or the like. These 
further details of our ontology aren’t settled by our being subjects. 
And yet the claim that we are subjects is not ontologically toothless. 
It does rule out some views, like those mentioned above. And it also 
rules out another well-known view — namely the view that we are 
bundles of mental states.4 On this view, we aren’t subjects of mental 
states; rather, we are mental states. I’m happy to rule this view out. 
For I’m with Thomas Reid when he says, ‘I am not thought, I am not 
                                                          
3  Some philosophers contrast subjectivity with objectivity, and then mistakenly infer from 
the fact that we are subjects that we couldn’t be objects/ontological subjects. I grant that 
there are important distinctions between the various senses of ‘objectivity’ and ‘sub-
jectivity’. For instance, there is an important distinction between things that have a point 
of view and things that don’t, between truths that depend on one’s point of view (or 
judgment) and those that don’t, and between subject awareness and object awareness 
(see e.g. Shoemaker, 1968; Evans, 2001). But it is a mistake to infer from any of this 
that subjects are not also objects ontologically. 
4  It also rules out variants of the bundle theory. For example, Barry Dainton (2008) 
claims (and Dainton and Bayne, 2005, suggest) that we are capacities for conscious-
ness. Since capacities are (arguably) properties — namely, dispositional properties — 
my claim that we are subjects of properties rules out our being capacities for 
consciousness. 
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 92 M.  DUNCAN 
action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and 
suffers’ (1785/2002, p. 264; see also Unger, 2006, p. 57). I agree. We 
are not mental states. We are subjects of mental states. We can be in 
mental states. But we are distinct from them. 
And, again, I say that what it is to be a subject is to be a thing that 
bears properties. And I say that to be a subject of experience is to bear 
phenomenal properties. I do not pretend to have given knockdown 
arguments against differing views. And I also don’t pretend that those 
who deny that we are subjects wouldn’t have interesting things to say 
in response. I just think their view is wrong, and I think it gets us off 
on the wrong foot about what we are and what our experiences are 
like. So I’ll only say to those who wish to develop a notion of sub-
jectivity that denies that we are subjects of properties: Godspeed. We 
part company here. 
3. What is Mystifying about Subjectivity? 
So we are things that bear properties. What’s so mystifying about 
that? The answer: nothing. That we are ontological subjects is neither 
mystifying nor particularly remarkable. And yet there clearly is some-
thing remarkable and mystifying about subjectivity, which has to do 
with how our subjecthood figures in consciousness. So it must be for 
some reason other than that we are ontological subjects. This is what 
I’ll discuss in this section. 
If the remarkable and mystifying nature of subjectivity doesn’t 
come from our being subjects, where does it come from? I think it 
comes from two related sources. First, it comes from the kind of sub-
jects we are. We are subjects of experience; we are capable of being 
consciously aware. And, as such, we each have our own unique point 
of view. Second, that we are subjects somehow features in conscious-
ness itself; it is part of the very structure of consciousness.5 
                                                          
5  I won’t insist that this is the only way to understand or categorize what’s remarkable 
and mystifying about subjectivity. However, as I stated earlier, I do think that these 
issues are connected at least in the sense that in order to understand how there could be 
subjective experience — or how it relates to the physical — we must understand what 
subjectivity is. Furthermore, I am also sympathetic to Zahavi and Kriegel’s claim 
(though not their view about what subjectivity is) here: ‘Like others (Levine 2001), we 
think that for-me-ness (or mineness, or subjective givenness) is the most fundamental 
fact about phenomenal consciousness, is indeed what makes it challenging in the first 
place. It would be nice to ultimately demystify phenomenal consciousness. But a first 
step is to identify correctly the source of the mystery. Our contention is that the source 
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There’s a lot to discuss here. But, given my purposes, there are just 
a few especially salient points that I wish to dwell on. Start with the 
fact that we subjects of experience are capable of being consciously 
aware of things. I, for instance, am now consciously aware of my 
computer screen, the noisy cars out on the street, my coffee, etc. In 
each case, there is something it is like for me to be aware of some 
thing or property. Next, we can also be consciously aware of certain of 
our own properties in a way that we can’t be aware of other things. 
The properties I am referring to are mental properties — specifically, 
phenomenal properties — and the unique way we can be aware of 
them is through introspection. Right now I am consciously aware of 
my sensations of my computer, the cars, and my coffee, as well as of a 
pain in my knee and a feeling of sleepiness. These are all phenomenal 
properties that I as a subject bear and that I am consciously aware of 
via introspection. Finally, it’s not just that I am consciously aware of 
these phenomenal properties; I am also aware of them as mine — as 
properties that I bear. That is, I am aware that I am their subject. 
As platitudinous as these claims about consciousness may seem, 
they strongly and persistently resist explanation. How there are sub-
jects of experience at all — subjects who are capable of being con-
sciously aware of things — is a long-standing philosophical puzzle. 
It’s unclear (to say the least) how subjective experience could arise 
from brain processes. Another long-standing puzzle concerns how our 
awareness of our own properties and of ourselves as the subjects of 
those properties is part of the very structure of consciousness. 
So, again, what’s remarkable and mystifying about subjectivity isn’t 
the fact that we are ontological subjects. It’s rather that we are sub-
jects who can be consciously aware of things (and thus have points of 
view), and the fact that this conscious awareness includes awareness 
of ourselves as the subjects of our phenomenal properties. 
4. Subjectivity as Self-Acquaintance 
In this section I will lay out the remaining essentials of my model of 
subjectivity. But I will arrive at this destination somewhat indirectly. 
Instead of leading with the details of my model, I will start by 
discussing some of what other philosophers say about subjectivity. 
This will allow us to home in on what we should and shouldn’t say 
                                                                                                                  
— the most fundamental, most general, most elemental dimension of phenomenal con-
sciousness — is for-me-ness’ (Zahavi and Kriegel, 2015, p. 20). 
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about our target phenomenon. And what will emerge is my own model 
of subjectivity. 
To start with, here’s what Dan Zahavi and Uriah Kriegel say about 
‘for-me-ness’ (i.e. subjectivity): 
…the ‘me’ of for-me-ness is not in the first instance an aspect of what is 
experienced but of how it is experienced; not an object of experience, 
but a constitutive manner of experiencing… the ‘me’ of for-me-ness is 
not a separate and distinct item but rather a ‘formal’ feature of experi-
ential life as such… [it is] an experiential dimension of all phenomenal 
characters that remains constant across them and constitutes the sub-
jectivity of experience. (2015, pp. 4, 5) 
Zahavi and Kriegel say that for-me-ness is a dimension of experience. 
Zahavi expounds upon this elsewhere, describing subjectivity as an 
‘experiential dimension’ (2005, p. 115), and glossing this as the view 
that subjectivity is the ‘first-personal givenness of experience’ (ibid., 
pp. 122, 124). He also calls this ‘mineness’ — that feature common to 
experiences whereby they are ‘characterized by a first-personal given-
ness that immediately reveals them as one’s own’ (ibid., p. 124). Here 
Zahavi acknowledges his debt to Edmund Husserl, who says: 
What is most originally mine is my life, my ‘consciousness,’ my ‘I do 
and suffer,’ whose being consists in being originally pre-given to me 
qua functioning I, i.e., in the mode or originality, in being experientially 
and intuitively accessible as itself. (Husserl, 1973, p. 429) 
Zahavi also cites Michel Henry as holding that ‘the most basic sense 
of self is the one constituted by the very self-givenness of experience’ 
(Zahavi, 2005, p. 125). 
My main concern with the above claims is that they don’t (at least 
not obviously) have anything to do with subjects or, indeed, sub-
jectivity. The way in which my experiences are given to me is, as 
Husserl (1973, p. 429) suggests, a matter of the way in which they are 
‘accessible’ to me. That is, givenness is a matter of my first-personal 
access to my own experiences — the way in which I am aware of 
them. But that I am aware of something doesn’t imply that my aware-
ness of it has some self-referential quality — some for-me-ness. By 
analogy, I might be aware of the house down the street without being 
aware of its owner. I might even be aware that the house has an 
owner, and yet not be aware of the owner. Likewise, that we have a 
certain kind of awareness of our experiences doesn’t imply that this 
awareness also comes along with awareness of ourselves as their sub-
jects, or that we as subjects show up or feature in any of our 
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experiences.6 So just citing our awareness of our experiences is not 
enough to capture or explain the subjectivity of those experiences.7 
One might respond by emphasizing that the way in which we are 
aware of our own experiences is unique — it’s unlike our awareness 
of houses, other people, or anything else. But that, by itself, won’t 
help. For, whether or not our awareness of our experiences is unique, 
just referencing our awareness of our experiences is not enough, since 
that, by itself, doesn’t bring subjects into the picture. Again, by 
analogy, suppose I tell you that I am aware of the house down the 
street in a unique way. That, by itself, does not entail that I am aware 
of the owner of the house (let alone aware of the owner as the owner 
of the house). Likewise, that our access to our experiences is unique, 
by itself, does not entail that we subjects figure in that awareness. 
Now, if the way in which this awareness is supposed to be unique is 
that it always involves awareness of ourselves as subjects of those 
experiences, then we’re on to something. But the reason we’re on to 
something is not because we’ve noted that our awareness of our 
experiences is unique; rather, it’s because we’ve noted that we sub-
jects feature in consciousness.8 Unique or not, awareness, access, 
                                                          
6  To see this point even more clearly, just think about animal minds. Various animals are 
consciously aware of things, including at least some of their own experiences (e.g. 
pains), but it is very unlikely that all such animals are also aware of themselves as the 
subjects of these experiences. This further shows that awareness (including awareness 
of one’s experiences), by itself, does not entail for-me-ness. Thus, it does not explain 
subjectivity. 
7  One might suggest that my awareness of my experiences — their ‘givenness’ — by 
itself yields subjectivity because it is I, the subject, to whom these experiences are 
given. But this still doesn’t get us subjectivity. That I am the subject of a property 
doesn’t imply that I experience it as such (or experience it at all!). A property could be 
mine — I could be the one who bears it — without that fact impacting my experiences 
in any way. And I could be aware of this property without its ‘mineness’ being part of 
my awareness of it. So unless the fact that I am the subject of my experiences somehow 
features in consciousness itself, the fact that I am the subject of my experiences doesn’t 
get us subjectivity. 
  Now, one could always deny that this sort of subjectivity exists. That is, one could 
claim that subjectivity isn’t part of consciousness — that in so far as it exists, it consists 
merely in experiences having subjects. But here I am taking it for granted that sub-
jectivity exists, and that in some form or other it is part of the structure of consciousness 
itself. If subjectivity in this sense doesn’t exist, then it’s not mystifying. I — as well as 
my interlocutors in this paper — assume that there is something there to puzzle over, at 
least at the outset (see e.g. Zahavi and Kriegel, 2015, pp. 2–3). 
8  Zahavi (2005) does sometimes say things to suggest that our awareness of our experi-
ences is unique in part because it always comes along with self-awareness. But if this is 
the view (which I commend), then notice that what’s crucial here in terms of 
 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 96 M.  DUNCAN 
givenness, and dimensions of experience aren’t what get us sub-
jectivity. For they, by themselves, don’t explain how subjects figure in 
consciousness. 
This worry also applies to other views about subjectivity, such as 
views that identify subjectivity with higher-order thought or per-
ception (see e.g. Carruthers, 2000; Rosenthal, 1986), affectivity (see 
e.g. Rudrauf and Damasio, 2006), nonwellfoundedness (see Wider, 
2006), availability to higher-level cognitive processes (see e.g. Tye, 
1995), or the self-(re)presentation of conscious states (see e.g. 
Williford, 2006; Horgan, Tienson and Graham, 2006; Levine, 2006). 
These views all identify subjectivity with the way in which we are 
aware of or undergo our experiences. These views may imply that 
subjects of experience exist. But they do not imply that subjects figure 
in experience itself.9 So they don’t get us subjectivity. 
Here I am criticizing a large swathe of views about subjectivity. 
That’s because I believe that a large swathe of views about sub-
jectivity fail to capture what subjectivity is. But that doesn’t mean that 
these views don’t have something going for them. In fact, they high-
light something very important about subjectivity. Specifically, their 
emphasis on our special access to our experiences, and the manner in 
which we undergo our experiences, is crucial. 
Let me expound a bit. It’s true that one remarkable thing about us 
subjects of experience is that, by introspecting, we can be aware of our 
own phenomenal properties in a unique sort of way. In other words, 
introspection affords us unique access to our experiences. There are 
various features of this access that make it unique. One is privacy: I 
alone have introspective access to my experiences. Another is 
immediacy: my experiences are immediately given to me; there’s 
nothing else in virtue of which I am aware of them. This latter notion 
has been developed in various ways. But I find Russell’s (1912) 
notion of acquaintance helpful. One is acquainted with something if 
                                                                                                                  
subjectivity isn’t anything to do with awareness per se, as Zahavi and Kriegel (2015, 
pp. 4, 5) maintain; rather, it’s to do with what we are aware of in consciousness — 
namely, ourselves. Furthermore, unless Zahavi grants that we are aware of ourselves as 
subjects of our experiences (and he doesn’t), then his view still comes up short in terms 
of explaining subjectivity. 
9  So-called ‘self-(re)presentational’ theories of consciousness may sound like an 
exception because of the word ‘self’. But here ‘self’ refers to mental states, not subjects 
of mental states. So the worry applies. 
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and only if one is directly aware of it.10 There are many things of 
which I am indirectly aware — e.g. the actor on my TV, my mother 
talking to me on the phone, and arguably even the external objects 
around me. But, according to most acquaintance theorists, including 
Russell, I am aware of these things only in virtue of being aware of 
my experiences of them; and it’s my experiences with which I am 
acquainted.11 
For reasons that will be evident later on, it’s worth briefly 
describing one of Russell’s main arguments for the claim that we are 
acquainted with our experiences. Russell starts by considering a table 
in front of him, and then says: 
My knowledge of the table as a physical object, on the contrary, is not 
direct knowledge. Such as it is, it is obtained through acquaintance with 
the sense-data that make up the appearance of the table. We have seen 
that it is possible, without absurdity, to doubt whether there is a table at 
all, whereas it is not possible to doubt the sense-data. (Russell, 1912, p. 
74) 
Russell claims that one can determine whether one is acquainted with 
something by considering whether one can (without absurdity) doubt 
that it exists. Russell can doubt that his table exists — perhaps by 
entertaining some sceptical scenario — but he can’t doubt that his 
experience of the table exists. So he concludes that he is acquainted 
with his experience, but not the table. This suggests the following test, 
which I’ll call ‘The Doubt Test’: if one’s awareness of some x is such 
that one cannot doubt that x exists, then one is acquainted with x. 
Hence, Russell is acquainted with his experience of the table, but the 
table itself doesn’t pass the test. 
                                                          
10  The notion of ‘directness’ in play here has both metaphysical and epistemic elements 
(cf. Gertler, 2012). There is a metaphysical element in that the relation of awareness I 
bear to an object of acquaintance is not mediated by any distinct entity or process. There 
is an epistemic directness here in that if one is acquainted with some x, then one can 
form beliefs about x the justification of which depends only on one’s awareness of x. 
11  Russell’s view is that we are acquainted with ‘sense-data’ and the mental events that 
constitute our awareness of those sense-data. But most contemporary philosophers, 
including most acquaintance theorists, reject Russell’s metaphysics of experience. So 
nowadays Russell’s main idea is typically stated as the claim that we can be and at least 
sometimes are acquainted with our experiences, whether these are states, objects, or, as 
I’ve suggested, properties instantiated by subjects at times. For more about the meta-
physics of the acquaintance theory, see Gertler (2012), Chalmers (2003), and Fumerton 
(1995). 
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Russell (1912) never explains why The Doubt Test is a good test for 
acquaintance. But there is a fairly straightforward rationale: if I am 
aware of some x, but only in virtue of being aware of some distinct y 
that indicates x’s existence, then I can doubt that y is a faithful wit-
ness, so to speak, to the existence of x (cf. Duncan, 2015; 2017). If a 
weather report says it’s raining, then I can doubt that there is rain 
because I can doubt that the weather report got it right. Or if I see a 
table, I can doubt that the table exists by supposing that an evil demon 
is deceiving me. Thus, in general, for things of which I am (or seem to 
be) aware, if I am not directly aware of some x, then I can doubt that x 
exists. And from this it follows that if I cannot doubt that x exists, 
then I am directly aware of x itself rather than some potentially false 
or misleading presentation of x that would allow me to doubt its 
existence. 
This further justifies the belief that we are acquainted with our 
experiences; or, in other words, that our experiences are given to us. 
But, as I’ve argued, this doesn’t get us subjectivity. For subjectivity 
requires our subjecthood to figure in consciousness itself. And the 
mere fact that we are acquainted with our experiences doesn’t deliver 
that result. 
So we need more. We need another element that brings our subject-
hood into the structure of consciousness. Some philosophers have 
tried to do this by appealing to a sense of ownership — a sense that 
our experiences are owned that goes beyond mere acquaintance with 
them. The problem is that a sense of ownership, by itself, isn’t enough 
to give our experiences a sense of ‘mineness’. It’s not enough to make 
them seem like my experiences. For my experiences could seem 
owned, but by someone else. This is what appears to happen when 
schizophrenics undergo ‘thought insertion’. In these cases, schizo-
phrenics experience their thoughts as owned, but they insist that they 
are not the owners. They insist that someone else is the agent or author 
of these thoughts. Now, my point here isn’t to give an interpretation of 
thought insertion (though I’ll return to this in §5). It’s just to illustrate 
that one could experience something as owned without experiencing 
oneself as the owner. Thus, positing a sense of ownership does not 
give us the full sense of mineness or self-awareness that we are 
looking for.12 
                                                          
12  Some philosophers who posit this sense of ownership go on to characterize it as an 
experience of oneself as the owner of the relevant mental states or actions (see, for 
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And this is what we are looking for. As many philosophers rightly 
point out, subjectivity is a form of self-awareness. Phenomenologists 
such as Franz Brentano (1874/1973) and Edmund Husserl (1984) are 
explicit about this. So are Lynn Rudder Baker (2000, pp. 60, 67), 
Peter Carruthers (1996, p. 152), Uriah Kriegel (2004, p. 105), Jean-
Paul Sartre (1957), Robert Van Gulick (2006, p. 11), Kathleen Wider 
(2006, p. 64), Kenneth Williford (2006, p. 113), Dan Zahavi (2005), 
and many others. This is crucial. Not because it goes very far in 
explaining what subjectivity is. After all, there are many ways in 
which we can be aware of ourselves that have little to do with sub-
jectivity (e.g. looking in a mirror, getting an MRI, talking to a thera-
pist, etc.). Rather, the point that subjectivity is a form of self-
awareness is crucial because it indicates that we subjects have a place 
in consciousness — that we are part of what we are aware of when we 
are consciously aware. 
Let me now summarize a few key points from the foregoing 
discussion. Subjectivity is a structural feature of consciousness 
whereby we subjects figure in consciousness itself. And subjectivity is 
thus a form of self-awareness. And this awareness somehow involves 
certain features characteristic of our access to our inner lives — 
privacy and immediacy — the latter of which I have cashed out in 
terms of acquaintance. 
I think the best way to respect the above points is to make use of 
resources already available to us. It is to extend the notion of acquaint-
ance to ourselves. It is to adopt a self-acquaintance model of sub-
jectivity. On this model, subjectivity is acquaintance with — that is, 
direct awareness of — oneself as the subject of one’s experiences. 
Although no one has defended this view in detail before now, the 
idea that we are self-acquainted is not new. Russell (1912, pp. 79–80), 
for example, talks favourably about the idea. So do Frege (1918/ 
1977), Kripke (2011), and James (1890/1983). But, as I’ve said, this 
idea has been ignored or dismissed far more often than it has been 
pursued. 
So let me now go into some more detail. Subjectivity is self-
acquaintance. It is direct awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s 
                                                                                                                  
example, Gallagher, 2000; Stephens and Graham, 2000; Billon, 2011; Guillot, 2013). I 
have no quarrel with these philosophers. My present point is just that positing a sense of 
ownership by itself — that is, without also positing a sense of self as owner — is not 
sufficient to capture the sense of mineness or self-awareness that we are looking for 
here. 
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experiences — as the bearer of phenomenal properties. This implies 
that subjectivity is unmediated self-awareness. It is unmediated by 
awareness of anything else, such as behaviour, descriptions, thoughts, 
etc. This is at odds with various accounts of self-awareness, including 
those that say we can be introspectively aware of ourselves only 
indirectly, in virtue of being aware of our mental states (see e.g. 
Howell, 2006). I don’t deny that we can be aware of ourselves 
indirectly. After all, I can be aware of myself by looking in a mirror, 
getting an MRI, or attending to my mental states. But, on my view, the 
most basic form of self-awareness is direct. 
Self-acquaintance makes its own distinctive contribution to the 
qualitative character of one’s total phenomenal experience. There is 
something that it is like to be directly aware of oneself. And this what-
it’s-like-ness is distinctive; it is unique; it is unlike the phenomenal 
character of any other experience. Part of what makes it distinctive is 
that it has a certain content: it is an experience of a self — a subject of 
experience. But that can’t be all. For we experience other subjects of 
experience as well — namely, each other. So I tentatively suggest that 
what’s responsible for the experiential distinctiveness of self-
acquaintance — what makes it different from the experience of other 
subjects of experience — is the immediacy, introspectability, and 
privacy of this form of self-awareness. I am the only subject of which 
I am immediately aware. I am the only subject of which I am intro-
spectively aware (this may be necessary — even true by definition). 
And although I am aware of other subjects of experience, I am not 
aware of them as subjects of experience in the same way that I am 
privately aware of myself as a subject of experience. For I am not 
privately aware of others’ mental states or the relation between them 
and their mental states. All of this yields the result that what it’s like 
to be acquainted with myself is unlike what it’s like to be aware of 
other people, objects, or properties. 
Self-acquaintance is achieved via introspection. But self-acquaint-
ance doesn’t require much attention. In this regard, self-acquaintance 
is akin to our awareness of our experiences and our awareness of 
objects of perception. Perception typically involves awareness of 
properties and objects that one is not focusing on or carefully 
attending to.13 Right now I’m focusing on my computer screen, but I 
                                                          
13  Which is not to say that perceptual awareness requires no attention. Cohen, Alvarez and 
Nakayama (2011), for example, argue that even peripheral perceptual awareness 
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am also aware of the books on my desk and the pictures on my wall. 
These items are in the periphery of my perceptual awareness. This is 
similar to my awareness of my experiences. Although I am constantly 
aware of my experiences, it’s rare that I focus on or carefully attend to 
them. They are in the periphery. I suggest that self-acquaintance is no 
different. Most of the time we are effortlessly acquainted with our-
selves. Most of the time self-acquaintance is non-reflective or 
peripheral/non-focal self-awareness (cf. Kriegel, 2004; Goldman, 
1970, p. 96; Ford and Smith, 2006). 
There is a question as to whether self-acquaintance is part of every 
human experience (maybe even of necessity). I believe that sub-
jectivity is part of every human experience, and may be so of 
necessity. So, given that I believe subjectivity is self-acquaintance, I 
believe that self-acquaintance is part of every human experience. 
However, this is a difficult issue. And the essentials of my model do 
not rest on whether there are or could be exceptions — that is, experi-
ences without subjectivity and, thus, without self-acquaintance. 
These are the essential facets of my model of subjectivity. Now, is 
there anything remarkable or mystifying about any of it? Once again, 
that we are consciously aware at all is remarkable and mystifying. But 
is there anything in my model of subjectivity in particular that is 
remarkable or mystifying? It is perhaps remarkable that, somehow, in 
consciousness, we are not only aware of external objects, we are also 
(directly) aware of ourselves, our mental properties, and our relation 
to those properties. But I don’t see anything particularly mystifying 
about this. The main concepts in play here are: subject (of experience) 
and acquaintance. We’ve already seen that there is nothing mystifying 
about ontological subjects. Some report finding the notion of acquaint-
ance mystifying. But, on my view, acquaintance is just direct aware-
ness. Setting aside once again the difficulty of understanding con-
scious awareness, which is beyond the scope of this paper, all I’ve 
added is directness. Readers can decide for themselves whether they 
find this concept mystifying. But I trust that it is at least an 
                                                                                                                  
requires some attention, for they found that subjects who were given a demanding task 
were prone to inattentional blindness. Here I remain neutral on how much attention is 
required for awareness. I just assume that we can be aware of at least some things that 
we are not carefully attending to or focusing on (which is widely accepted, and also 
obvious). I also remain neutral on the nature of this peripheral awareness (e.g. what it 
takes to be peripherally aware, what it’s like in terms of its fine-grainedness or detail, 
whether it is especially prone to cognitive penetration, etc.). 
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improvement in clarity on this topic — progress toward demystifying 
subjectivity. 
In the next section I will consider several objections to my model of 
subjectivity. But before doing so I want to lay out one further, posi-
tive, reason to believe that we are acquainted with ourselves — that is, 
a reason beyond the fact that doing so leads to an attractive and 
tractable view of what subjectivity is. To appreciate this reason, recall 
Russell’s (1912) Doubt Test for acquaintance. According to Russell, 
one is acquainted with something if one’s awareness of it is such that 
one cannot doubt that it exists. So, for example, Russell is acquainted 
with his experience of his table, because he cannot doubt that this 
experience exists, but he can’t say the same about the table itself, 
because he can doubt that it exists. 
Now, our concern is whether we are acquainted with ourselves. So 
we have to apply The Doubt Test to ourselves. Elsewhere I’ve argued 
that we pass The Doubt Test (see Duncan, 2015). So I will not go into 
too much detail here. But the short of it is this: I, like Descartes, 
cannot doubt my own existence. An evil demon could be tricking me 
about all sorts of things, but it couldn’t be tricking me about that. One 
barrier to scepticism about my own existence is purely logical: an evil 
demon couldn’t trick me into falsely believing that I exist, since I have 
to exist in order to be tricked.14 But we can bracket this purely logical 
barrier to scepticism and ask whether, on the basis of my self-
awareness, I can rule out all sceptical scenarios in which I do not 
exist. And the answer is still: yes. For a little reflection reveals the 
absurdity in the idea that I might not be the one who is occupying this 
particular mental perspective that I seem to be occupying right now. 
The issue isn’t with the idea of another person (or no one at all) 
undergoing experiences that are qualitatively similar or even identical 
to my experiences. The issue is with the idea that someone else (or no 
one) might turn out to be occupying this particular perspective and 
undergoing these particular experiences that I seem to be undergoing 
right now. That’s what seems absurd. I am inseparable from my per-
spective and the way things seem from my perspective. So there is no 
                                                          
14  Descartes (1643/1993) seems to suggest this line of reasoning. However, many 
Descartes scholars deny that Descartes ever meant to express an inability to doubt his 
own existence for these purely logical reasons. They contend that his expressed inability 
to doubt his own existence is, in every instance, an expression of a more robust 
apprehension of his own existence. See e.g. Hintikka (1962) and Williams (1978, 
chapter 3). 
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sceptical scenario in which things seem as they do here and yet in 
which I do not exist. Thus, in this way, I cannot doubt that I exist. 
There’s plenty more to discuss here (see Duncan, 2015). But, 
already at this point, we have at least prima facie reason to believe 
that we pass The Doubt Test. So, given the plausibility of The Doubt 
Test, we have prima facie reason to believe that we are acquainted 
with ourselves. This is a further reason to buy into self-acquaintance. 
But now didn’t David Hume famously deny that he could find him-
self in experience by introspecting? And isn’t that enough to show that 
we can doubt our own existences? The quick answer is: no. That 
Hume couldn’t find himself by some particular means doesn’t imply 
that he could doubt his own existence.15 And even if it did, The Doubt 
Test is a first-personal test for acquaintance, and so we must each 
assess the results for ourselves (see Duncan, 2015). And those of us 
who think there is such a thing as subjectivity (a view I’m assuming 
for the purposes of this paper) should be especially receptive to 
denying Hume’s claim about experience. But this gets us into a 
broader set of issues — including ones involving Hume’s claim — 
that are the focus of the next section. So let’s turn there now. 
5. Objections 
No one until now has developed an acquaintance model of subjectivity 
or self-awareness. The idea that we are acquainted with ourselves has 
received some speculative support (e.g. Russell, 1912; Kripke, 2011; 
Frege, 1918/1977; James, 1890/1983). But mostly it has been ignored 
or dismissed. This is for three main reasons. In this section I will 
address each of them, and show that they are not good reasons to deny 
that we are self-acquainted. 
The first reason self-acquaintance has been ignored is because there 
is a suspicion that our being self-acquainted would require some 
unseemly metaphysics — specifically, it would require us to be 
Cartesian egos or something of the like. 
                                                          
15  Indeed, it’s debatable whether Hume (1739/1975) ever really doubted (or expressed 
doubts about) his own existence. It’s true that he says he couldn’t find himself by intro-
specting, but, again, that only implies that he couldn’t find himself by some particular 
means. He also at one point identifies himself (and each other person) with a bundle of 
experiences (I.iv.6), but that isn’t so much a denial of his existence as a claim about 
what he is. What’s more, later on (in the Appendix) he expresses dissatisfaction and 
uncertainty about these views regarding the self and self-experience. 
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But I hope it’s clear by now that this is mistaken. That we are self-
acquainted implies almost nothing with respect to our ontology. As 
I’ve argued (§2), that we are subjects does not imply that we are 
Cartesian egos or anything similar. Subjects form a very general, very 
inoffensive ontological category. So direct awareness of subjects only 
saddles us with unwanted metaphysical baggage if it implies or 
reveals something further about our ontology. But plausibly, it 
doesn’t. What we can learn about our ontology from introspection is 
quite limited. Self-acquaintance reveals that we are subjects of experi-
ence — that is, bearers of phenomenal properties. But that’s about it. 
This hardly implies that we are Cartesian egos or the like. 
The root of this mistake seems to be in drawing an illicit inference 
from how we are aware of ourselves to a conclusion about what we 
are — that is, about our ontological nature. For example, it has been 
argued that since we aren’t aware of ourselves as physical bodies, we 
aren’t physical bodies (or else we aren’t self-aware; Anscombe, 1994). 
But that we aren’t always aware of ourselves as bodies doesn’t imply 
that we aren’t bodies. It only implies that we aren’t always aware of 
ourselves as such. The fallacy here is the move from ‘I am not aware 
of x as such-and-such’ to ‘x is not such-and-such’. So when I say that 
in self-acquaintance I am aware of myself as a subject of experience 
but that’s about it, this doesn’t imply that a subject of experience is all 
I am. And it doesn’t imply that I am non-physical. So my point is this: 
self-acquaintance doesn’t license the inference that would be required 
to move from self-acquaintance to unseemly metaphysics. So self-
acquaintance doesn’t saddle us with unseemly metaphysics.16 
The second reason self-acquaintance has been ignored is because it 
is often associated with an ill favoured view — namely, the view that 
our normal procedure for self-attributing mental states relies on our 
introspectively identifying ourselves. Sydney Shoemaker (1994), 
among others, criticizes this view, saying that our mental self-
attributions couldn’t rely on self-identification, since identification 
always goes hand-in-hand with the possibility of misidentification; 
and yet, we are immune from misidentifying ourselves when we self-
attribute mental states. This is considered a problem for self-
                                                          
16  To put an even finer point on it: self-acquaintance itself doesn’t saddle us with any 
unseemly metaphysics. But there’s still the question of what is required, in terms of 
underlying ontology, for us to be self-acquainted subjects of experience. To answer this 
question would be to answer, among other things, what underlying ontology is required 
for consciousness. As I’ve said, I have no answer to that question. 
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acquaintance. It’s not that the claim of self-acquaintance entails any 
particular view about mental self-attribution (it doesn’t). Rather, it’s 
that many philosophers see an evident explanatory connection 
between self-awareness and mental self-attribution. So, understand-
ably, there is an expectation that claims like we are self-acquainted 
will inevitably run into Shoemaker’s objection. 
However, there are some plausible responses. One is to say that 
introspective self-identification is simply a special case of identifica-
tion — one that is immune to error. After all, there’s never anyone 
else with whom I am acquainted as the subject of my experience for 
whom I could mistake myself introspectively. 
But I prefer a different response. I grant that self-attributions do not 
typically rely on self-identification. I say that self-acquaintance, and 
the relation between ourselves and our mental states, is normally taken 
for granted — simply assumed as a background feature of our experi-
ences, and only questioned when significantly altered or impaired (as 
in cases of mental disorder). This is perfectly consistent with the claim 
that we are self-acquainted, and indeed, with the claim that self-
acquaintance plays a fundamental role in self-awareness and mental 
self-attribution. The role of self-acquaintance in a theory of self-
awareness is its role in the acquisition and development of first-
personal concepts, and its non-focal role in the maintenance and 
deployment of those concepts. I believe that such a theory can explain 
various phenomena associated with basic self-awareness. But my 
present point is just this: the way to deal with Shoemaker’s objection 
is to grant his main point and then point out that it’s compatible with 
self-acquaintance. Then the worry disappears. 
The third, and to my mind primary, reason self-acquaintance has 
been ignored or dismissed is because it runs afoul of Hume’s (1739/ 
1975) aforementioned claim about introspection: 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 
at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but 
the perception. (I.iv.6) 
A lot of philosophers agree with Hume that, when we introspect, all 
we find are various mental states — we don’t find any extra subject of 
experience that we might call ‘the self’. Shoemaker even goes as far 
as to say that Hume’s claim has ‘commanded the assent of the 
majority of subsequent philosophers who have addressed the issue’ 
(1994, p. 188). I am not as confident as Shoemaker that Hume’s claim 
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about introspection really is quite so widely accepted.17 But certainly it 
enjoys significant popularity. 
Even so, I believe that we should reject Hume’s claim. I grant that 
there is a certain allure to the idea that introspection reveals nothing 
but mental states. Indeed, as I’ve said, I believe that this is the most 
significant challenge for a self-acquaintance model of subjectivity to 
overcome. Still, I believe that the first step in dealing with this 
challenge is to say: Hume was wrong. The self does show up in 
consciousness. 
The next step is to support this claim with arguments. So let me just 
conclude by offering four reasons why we (especially those of us 
interested in subjectivity) should be receptive to rejecting Hume’s 
claim. The first is, ironically, phenomenological. To me (and others), 
it seems clear that consciousness is not a mere collection of anony-
mous experiences strung together in succession. There is more to con-
sciousness. My experiences are experienced as mine, and this ‘for-me-
ness’ is a further aspect of experience. (How else could I tell my 
experiences from others’? What else could make these experiences 
manifestly mine?) This may sound like I’m just registering my dis-
agreement with Hume. And to a certain extent that’s true. But let me 
just add this: this paper is about what subjectivity is. So I have 
assumed that there is such a thing as subjectivity, and that it is part of 
the structure of consciousness. Anyone who has followed me this far 
should be at least somewhat sympathetic to my description of con-
sciousness in response to Hume. That there is subjectivity implies that 
there is a whole other aspect of experience beyond individual mental 
states. It is a distinctive ‘for-me-ness’. It is self-awareness. It is me 
figuring in my experiences. So anyone who buys that there is sub-
jectivity should be poised on phenomenological grounds to reject 
Hume’s claim. 
Now, as I’ve said, a range of philosophers who work on subjectivity 
defend views that do not imply that subjects feature in consciousness 
itself. So these philosophers may (and often do) contend that their 
views are consistent with Hume’s claim. But, as I’ve argued (§4), that 
these views fail to explain how subjects feature in consciousness is 
among their shortcomings. So I say that in so far as these views stay 
                                                          
17  More than a few philosophers at least register their disagreement with Hume’s claim, 
including Chalmers (1996, p. 10), Strawson (2000), Bayne (2008), Kriegel (2004), and 
Swinburne (1985). 
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true to Hume’s claim, they forsake subjectivity. With that said, I’m 
not sure these views really do stay true to Hume’s claim. For even if 
they agree with Hume that introspection does not reveal a substantial 
self, the idea that there is an experiential dimension of subjectivity — 
a ‘for-me-ness’ — runs afoul of Hume’s claim that all there is to 
experience is a succession of mental states. Philosophers ought to own 
up to this. If you think there is genuine subjectivity, then you think 
there is something more to experience than a succession of anony-
mous mental states. So, again, anyone who buys into subjectivity 
should be receptive to parting ways with Hume. 
The second reason we should be receptive to rejecting Hume’s 
claim is that recent research on mental disorder casts considerable 
doubt on it. In particular, certain disorders of consciousness appear to 
involve breakdowns in self-experience in a way that suggests that self-
experiences are normally present (cf. Sass, 2000, p. 154; Frith, 1992, 
p. 80; Billon, 2014). Consider, for example, the phenomenon of 
thought insertion found among schizophrenics. People who suffer 
from thought insertion believe that some of the thoughts they experi-
ence come from external agents. It’s not just that they believe that 
others are controlling or influencing their thoughts; they believe that 
others are actually thinking/bringing about those thoughts. On what’s 
now the leading account of this phenomenon, thought insertion 
essentially involves a breakdown in the experience of oneself as the 
author/agent of one’s thoughts.18 In other words, in these abnormal 
cases, the self fails to show up in experience in the role of author/ 
agent of one’s thoughts, resulting in a significant experiential deficit. 
This suggests that, in normal cases, the self does show up in experi-
ence in the role of author/agent of one’s thoughts.19 Similar arguments 
can and have been made through appeal to other pathological 
                                                          
18  Lynn Stephens and George Graham (2000) were among the first to develop this 
account, which has gained fairly widespread support among philosophers and psychol-
ogists who study schizophrenia (see e.g. Coliva, 2002; Radden, 1999, p. 355; Gallagher, 
2000; Bayne, 2004; Kriegel, 2004, p. 189). But even if their account is wrong in certain 
details — e.g. that thought insertion involves a sense of agency — the evidence from 
this phenomenon would still cut against Hume’s claim as long as it indicates that we 
normally have self-experiences. 
19  Which is not to say that those who experience inserted thoughts completely fail to 
experience themselves. Stephens and Graham (2000), as well as others, carefully argue 
that although these patients fail to experience themselves as the authors/agents of their 
thoughts, they still experience themselves as the subjects of their thoughts (see e.g. pp. 
126–7, 153). 
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phenomena.20 And what these arguments suggest is that Hume is 
wrong — experience is not just a succession of mental states; it also 
includes a sense of self. 
Now, we still have a lot to learn about disorders of consciousness. 
And although I have described the currently dominant account of 
thought insertion, other accounts of this phenomenon are out there. 
That being said, the evidence from mental disorder is suggestive. It 
appears to support a plausible abductive argument against Hume’s 
claim about experience. So it should at least make us receptive to 
rejecting Hume’s claim. 
The third reason we should be receptive to rejecting Hume’s claim 
is that there are other plausible explanations for why it might seem 
like introspection doesn’t reveal a self. First, self-acquaintance is 
ubiquitous. It’s always there. And because it’s ubiquitous, it’s less 
noticeable. It fades into the background like the continuous hum of an 
air conditioner. Second, self-acquaintance is typically in the periphery 
of our consciousness (§4). We don’t usually focus on or carefully 
attend to ourselves. Perhaps we never do. Perhaps we can’t (cf. 
Peacocke, 2014, chapter 3). Finally, self-acquaintance doesn’t reveal 
much about the self. I am acquainted with myself as the subject of my 
experiences, but that’s about it. So self-acquaintance isn’t as compre-
hensive as one might expect. These points deserve further develop-
ment. But my point here is just this: that it may seem like we can’t 
find ourselves in consciousness — that the self is ‘elusive’ — can be 
explained without accepting Hume’s claim. This makes rejecting 
Hume’s claim more palatable. 
The fourth and final reason we should be receptive to rejecting 
Hume’s claim is, well, my arguments in this paper! That we are self-
acquainted undergirds a clear and attractive theory of subjectivity. It is 
evidenced by our certainty of our own existences. And, with a little 
work, it can overcome its most prominent objections. These are good 
reasons to accept that we are self-acquainted. Thus, they are good 
reasons to reject Hume’s claim that we are not self-acquainted. At the 
very least, they should make us receptive to doing so. 
                                                          
20  These include schizophrenics’ experiences of alien voices and delusions of control (see 
Frith and Johnston, 2003, chapter 7; Stephens and Graham, 2000; Bayne, 2008), 
depersonalization disorder (see Billon, 2014), Cotard’s delusion (see Billon, 2014), and 
anarchic hand syndrome (see Bayne, 2004; 2008; Campbell, 2002). 
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